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I.
It is a well known principle of Equity that a trustee shall not
be allowed to derive a profit from the subject matter of his
trust. If an improper disposition of trust money is made by a
trustee, the right devolves upon the cestui-que-trust either to
compel the repayment of the sum so invested with interest, or
to follow the fund itself into the specific piece of property into
which it has been converted. "The rule is," said Mr. Justice
Story in Oliver v. Piatt," that all the gains made by the trustee,
by a wrongful appropriation of the trust fund, shall go to the
cestui-que-trust, and all the losses shall be botrne by the trustee
himself:" 3 How. 4O. This principle has been applied to
speculation in loans, stocks, commercial paper, and real estate,
to the employment of trust money in business firms and trad-
ing companies, and to all other classes of investments which
the Courts regard as inappropriate to the proper execution of
a trust. Perry on Trusts, Ed. of 1889, §§ 456, 464, a.nd cases
cited. A case involving unusual difficulty is that of a trustee
who invests trust money in a business conducted by himself,
especially if there are associated with him one or more persons
who are not trustees. In the case of a partnership, rights and
liabilities spring into existence between the trustee, his co-
partners and the cestui-que-trust which are most complex in
their character, and which present many important modifica-
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tions of the general doctrine. The equitable principles by
which these rights and liabilities are defined and adjusted will
be the subject of consideration in these pages.
The theory upon which a trustee is held accountable for
profits that accrue to trust property has been the subject of
much judicial discussion. It is clear that such profits, when
exacted from a trustee, cannot be construed as a penalty for
misconduct, since it is not within the province of a Court of
Equity to impose penalties. To quote the words of Lord
Justice James in Vyse v. Foster, "A Court of Equity is not a
court of penal jurisdiction. It compels restitution of property
unconscientiously withheld; it gives full compensation for any
loss or damage through failure of some equitable duty i but it
has no power of punishing anyone." L. R., 8 Ch. Ap. 333 ;
see also 4tty. Gen. v. Alfard, 4 D. M. & G. 85 !. Further, if
profits were exacted as a penalty for bad faith or misconduct,
it would follow that a trustee might .rebut the presumption of
liability by setting up the-defence that he had acted in good
faith, and that the investment had proved to be a safe one for
the estate, whereas it has frequently been held that the motive
which prompted the trustee to make the investment is entirely
immaterial. Heathcoate v. Hulrme, I J. & W. 129. Nor can
the liability of a trustee to account for profits be explained by
the opposite theory that Equity will presume that he acted
with a good intent and in the interest of the trust estate.
Laird v. ChisholIn, 30 Scot. Jur. 584; Parsons on Partnership,
§ 39. Such a presumption would be inconsistent with the
well established principle that the investment of trust funds in
trade is ipso facto a breach of trust. The law condemns such
an investment without regard to the motives which prompted
it or the results which it may secure. Consequently the pre-
sumed good intention of the trustee can no more-be regarded
as the basis of his responsibility than his presumed bad inten-
tion, and we have seen that the latter theory is untenable. A
more logical explanation of the trustee's liability to account for
profits has been suggested by Lord Cranworth in the case of
Robinson v. Robinson, 9 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 75, viz.: that the
cestui-que-trust has a valid claim to profits because they are the
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natural increment of his estate. Hence, his, title to such pro-
fits, if he chooses to exert it, takes precedence over the title
of the trustee, and the latter may be compelled to account for
them in the same manner and upon the same ground as he is'
liable to account for the principal of the estate. On the other
band, if the investment has been unsuccessful and no profits
have accrued, the trustee may be charged with interest, Since,
in violation of his trust, he has neglected to invest the estate in
appropriate interest-bearing securities, a Court of Equity will
compensate the cestui-que-trust for the resulting loss by charg-
ing him with the interest which he might and ought to have
obtained. The cestui-que-trust has the right to elect, in all
cases, either to hold the trustee liable for the profits which
have actually been realized, or for interest at whatever rate the
Court may deem appropriate in view of the circumstances of
the case. To restate the doctrine thus elaborated in another
form; the employment of trust funds in trade constitutes a
breach of trust by which the trustee renders himself primarily
liable for the principal sum invested with interest. If the pro-
fits accruing to the trustee exceed the amount of interest due,
the cestzei-que-trvust is entitled to claim them in lieu of interest
by virtue of his beneficial ownership in the property from which
they are derived.
The equitable doctrine that a trustee is liable for the profits
of trust money can be traced back through a period of nearly
two hundred years. In its present form it is the outgrowth of
a series of Chancery decisions which date from the reign of
Queen Anne. The case of Brown v. Litton, io Modern, 20;
I P. W. 140; decided in 1711, is the oldest authority upon this
subject which is to be found in the reports. The important
facts of that case were that the master of a ship died while at
sea, leaving among his effects the sum of 200 pounds. Dur-
ing the remainder of the voyage his successor employed. the
money in a series of trading operations which yielded a net
gain of three hundred per cent. Upon the return of the vessel
to England, the widow of the deceased master filed a bill in
the Court of Chancery, praying that an account of the profits
of the voyage might be decreed. Lord Keeper Harcourt sus-
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tained the bill upon the, ground that the master had by his
conduct constituted himself a trustee both as to the principal
sum and the resulting profits. The Lord Keeper, having no
authority to cite in support of this conclusion, based his opinion.
upon the curious ground that since England was an island, it
was the policy of the law to give the greatest possible encour-
agement to commerce, and that this end would be furthered by
the adoption of the principle in question, since it would be "a
comfort to a man to know that if he should die, the improve-
ment of his effects in the way of trade should be for the
advantage of his family." io Mod. 21. The case of Brown
v Litton, is the foundation stone of the general equitable-
doctrine governing the accountability of trustees who trade-
with trust funds; and it is worthy of note that in the same case
occurs the earliest statement of the supplementary doctrine,
which, as we shall see, is still in a very crude state of develop-
ment, that- a trustee who has expended time and, labor upon.
the trade -of pursuit in which the trust funds are embarked, is.
entitled to receive a fair proportion of the resulting profits as.
compensation.
During the last century the eqtfitable doctrines established-
by Brown v. Lztton underwent no appreciable development
Early in the present century, however, a custom became gen-
eral in the Court of Chancery to charge an executor or trustee
who negligently permitted trust fulnds to remain uninvested,
with interest at the rate of four per cent., and a trustee who,
invested such funds in an improper manner with interest at
five per cetnt.: Tew v. Earl of Winterton, I Ves. 452; Piety v.
Stace, 4 Ves. 619; Pocock v. Redington, 5 Ves. 799; Roche v.
Hjart, II Ves. 58; Bates v. Scales, 12 Ves. 402; Forbes v..
Ross, 2 Cox- i13; Tebbs v. Carpenter, I Madd. 290. Thus the
latter rate was regularly imposed upon all trustees who
mingled trust money with their private capital, whether it was.
actually employed in commercial operations, or merely alloweo
to remain on deposit as part of the trustee's private account.
The higher rate of interest was charged in the latter case upon
the ground that a large balance in the bank has a tendency to.
give a trader additional credit: Sutton v. Sharp, I Russ. 146
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Treves v. Townshend, i Cox, 50. At first, interest at five per
cent. was the largest amount ever allowed by the.Court, but
in the case of Raphael v. Boehm, I I Ves. 92, in which a very
gross breach of trust had been committed, Lord Eldon intro-
duced the practice of charging a delinquent trustee, in certain
cases, with compound interest. Although the decree in that
case was at the time regarded by other judges as very severe,
it has been followed as a precedent in numerous instances
where a great breach of trust has been committed, and other
methods of compensating the injured party have been adjudged
inadequate: Stacpoole v. Stacpoole, 4 Dow. 209; Walker v.
Woodward, I Russ. 1O7; Jones v. Foxall, 15 Beav. 388;
Williams v. Powell, 15 Ibid. 461 ; Townend v. ]'ownend, I Giff..
201. Seguin's Appeal, 103 Pa. 139; Perry on -Trusts, edit. of
1889, §§ 468, 471, and cases cited. It would appear
from the decisions, especially the opinion of the Master of
the Rolls in Jones v. Foxall, that the Court will be influenced
in determining whether compound interest shall be charged
by such considerations as the strictness- of the terms employed.
in the trust instrument and the extent to which the trustee fias
departed from them, the risks to which the trust property
has been exposed, the length of time during which the mis-
conduct of the trustee has continued, and the advantage
which he has personally derived from the breach of trust.
At the same time, however, that the interest rule was being
generally applied to the class of cases just described, a series
of decisions was being rendered by the Court of Chancery
requiring an account of profits in another class of cases very
closely analogous. In Palmer v. Mitchell, 2 M. & K. 672,
decided in 18o9, and quoted from the Register's Book in a
later case, an account of profits was decreed against
one of the executors 'of a decedent who had continued
the business of his testator in partnership with certain other
persons. In the case of Heaihcote V. 'Hulme, I. J. & W. 122,
decided in 1819, the administratrix of a deceased merchant
continued the business for a period of several "years, and the
Court held that the next of kin of the decedent were entitled
to the profits. It appears also from numerous cases reported
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in the Register's Books, that very early in this century the
principle had become well established that the surviving part-
ners of a decedent as such, might be held accountable to his
personal representatives for the profits realized in the business
after his death: Crawshay v. Collins, 15 Ves. 218, and cases
cited. In the great case of Crawshay v. Collins, which was in
Chancery for eighteen years, and which came before Lord Eldon
five times for adjudication, this principle was extended further.
In that case A, B, and C, were members of a partnership. C,
having become bankrupt, his co-partners continued the busi-
ness without him for several years and made large profits. D,
the assignee of C, filed a bill against the other two partners,
claiming the proportion of profits to which C would have been
entitled if the bankruptcy had not occurred. A decree was
rendered in D's favor upon the ground that by trading with
the bankrupt's assets,_A and B had constituted themselves
trustees, and had become subject to a trustee's liability.
it will be observed that in all of these early cases the profits
awarded by the Court were the result of the contilnuation of a.
trade or business which had previously belonged in whole or
in part to the person from whom the trust estate was derived.
The interest rule was still applied to the case of a trustee who
mingled trust money with funds of his own in a separate busi-
ness conducted by himself. In the case of Docker v. Somes,
2 M. & K. 655, decided in 1833, in which two executors were
shown to have employed funds belonging to their testator's
estate in their private business, Lord Chancellor Brougham
refused to follow the interest rule, and held them both liable
for a share of the accruing profits. It was the opinion of the
Lord Chancellor that profits ought to be charged against a
trustee who mingled trust money with his capital in a private
venture ot his own just as much as in the case of a trustee
who continued a business established by another person. The
interest rule was objectionable because it had "a tendency -to
Cipple the just power of the court in the most wholesome of
its functions," and because of the encouragemL-nt thus held
out to fraud and breaches of trust. The five per cent. rule,
.said the Lord Chancellor, virtually proclaimed to executors
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and trustees that they had only to mix trust money with their
private capital, and they could then keep all that remained
over five per cent.
The case of Docker v. Somes, not only decided that a trustee
cannot escape from the liability to account for profits by mix-
ing the funds, but the Court declared further that it would not
be deterred in that or in any other case from directing such an
account either by reason of the large expense involved or the
obstacles which would have to be overcome. The case of
H-eathcote v. Hulme, as we have seen, established the principle
that a trustee will not be relieved from liability merely
because he has acted in good faith. Neither is it any
defence that the trust fund bears only a very small proportion
to the total capital employed, nor that the trustee was
ignorant of the liability which he incurred, nor that the
money could have been borrowed elsewhere by the trustee's
firm at 'the same or at lower rates of interest, nor that
the firm was able and willing to repay the money whenever it
was called for. It has been decided also that no peculiarity in
the organization of the business, whether it is in the form of
an ordinary partnership or of a chartered corporation, will
affect the right of the cestui-que-trust to claim profits. Nor
can the investment of trust funds in a firm be disguised under
the form of a loan secured by a bond or a promissory note.
In that and all similar cases, a Court of Equity will disregard
the form of the transaction and look only at the substance:
Parsons on Partnershifp, § 40; Townend v. Townend, I
Giff. 201 ; Small's Estate, 24 W. N. C. 92; Kyle v. Barnett, 17
Ala. 306; Busk v. Bus11, 33 Kan. 556.
II.
It is now time to notice certain limitations which Courts of
Equity have imposed upon the right of a cestui-que-trustto de-
mand an account of profits from his trustee. A careful ex-
amination of the authorities will disclose four distinct lines of
defence of which a trustee can avail himself in a suit of this
character. They are as follows:
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(I.) That the investment producing the profits claimed was
authorized by the instrument creating the trust, and that the
terms imposed by it have been strictly complied with.
(2.) That theprofits claimed have never come into the trustee's
possession.
(3.) That the fund prioducing the profits was not trust prop-
erty at the time they accrued.
(4.) That the profits are attributable either wholly or partially
to productive factors other than the trust estate.
(I.) A good illistrition of the first of these different lines of
defence is the case of a testator who authorizes his executor to
loan the asset9 of. his estate to a certain business establishment
at a specified rate of interest. The executor could not be held
responsible for the profits accruing to the capital loaned, even
though he derived a personal advantage from the transaction:
Parker v. Bloxam, 20 Beav. 295 ; Travis v. Mine, 9 Hare 141.
(2.) It has already been stated that the liability of a trustee
to account for profith is based upon the theory of.restitution
and not upon the theory that it is imposed as a penalty. Now
there can be no such thing as a restitution of property which
has never been in the possessiorr of the- person from whom
restituti6n' is sought. Hence, a trustee cannot be held liable
for" profits'which he has not individually received. Profits
which have accrued to third persons can be recovered, if at all,
only from those in possession of them. A distinction must
therefore be drawn, with reference to the question of liability
for profits, between the case of a trustee who is, and one who
is not, a member of the partnership in which the fund produc-
ing the profits is invested. It is a well established rule that in
the latter case a trustee is-not responsible for profits, but only
for the principal of the trust estate with interest: Stroud v.
Gwyer, 28 Beaven, 13o. He cannot be charged with profits
for the simple reason that he has never received any.
Nor.is the position of a trustee at all modified in this respect
by the fact that the partners who employ the funds in trade are
his co-trustees. The latter may, of course, be held responsible
by the cestuf-que-trust for the profits which accrue, but the
liability of the trustee who is not a member of the firm, is
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limited, as in the preceding case, to the repayment of the
principal sum with interest: Booth v. Booth, I Beaven 125;
Townend v. Townend, I Giff. 2 1o; Laird v. Ckslzoilm, 30 Scot.
Jur. 589; Vyse v. Foster, 7 E. & I. Ap. 318. This question
received a very full discussion in the Scotch case of Laird v.
Chislwhlm, 30 Scot. Jur. 589, and the principle there laid down
has been adopted in later English cases. The Lord Ordinary
having taken the opposite view that a trustee might be charged
with profits, although not a member of the firm, a majority of
the judges in the Court of Sessions overruled, the decision of
the lower court and held that a trustee could under no circum-
stances be charged with profits which he did not actually
receive. A trustee occupying this position, might, in the
opinion of the Court, be -held responsible for funds lost through
his neglect, but he could not be held "penally liable for allow-
ing others to make profits." We shall have occasion here-
after to note the application of the same principle to the case
of a trustee who shares the profits of trust property with his
co-partners in a firm. In the meantime it can be laid down as
an invariable rule, that in order to charge a trustee with profits,
it is an essential requisite to prove that at some time he has
had either actual or constructive possession of the profits
which the cestui-que-trust seeks to recover.
(3.) A trustee may in the third place defend against a suit
for profits upon the ground that the fund producing them was
not trust property at the time the profits accrued. This is a
defence very commonly set up by the surviving partners of
deceased persons in suits brought by,their personal representa-
tives to obtain profits resulting from a continuation of the busi-
ness. We have seen that the liability toaccount for profits
attaches not only to an executor who assumes the place of his
testator in a firm, but also to the surviving partners as such,
upon the ground, as stated by Lord Chancellor Hart
in Booth v. Parks, I Moll, 465, that a surviving partner
cannot be said to continue the partnership, since that is dis-
solved by the death of the decedent, but he .rather deals
-with the effects "ex necessitate, and in the character of a trustee :"
See also Skidmore v. Collier, 8 Hun. (N. Y.) 54; Forresterv.
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Oliver, I Brad. (Ill.) 264. Consequently it has been held that
a surviving partner who continues to trade with the firm assets,
thereby becomes liable to the estate of the deceased for a pro-
portionate share of the profits earned, and as in the case of an
express trustee, he can be compelled to replace with interest
alr sums which are lost: Crawshay v. Collins, 15 Ves. 223,
226, and cases cited from the Register's Books; Hammond v"
Douglas, 5 Ves. 539 ; Featherstonaugh v. Fenwick, 17 Ves. 298;
Brown's Appeal, 89 Pa. 139; Story on Partnership, §§ 341,
343. If, however, the share of the decedent in the firm is sold,
either to his co-partners or to a stranger, his estate loses all
claim to profits which may subsequently accrue: Ogden v.
Astor, 4 Sand. (N. Y.) 349. It is true that his co-partners are
not permitted to takelthe share of the decedent at a valuation
fixed by themselves: Crawshay v. Collins, 15 Ves. 218, 227 ;
Sigourney v. Munn, 7 Conn. I I; Heath v. Waters, 40 Mich.
466, but his personal representatives may sell the share, pro-
vided the terms of the sale are fair and reasonable, just as they
have the power to sell any other kind of personal property :
Chambers v. Howell, I I Beav. 6. If one or more of the per-
sonal representatives are also co-partners, then the transaction
is subject to the well known rule of Equity, that a trustee can-
not purchase at his own sale without the permission of the
Court, and such a sale, if made, will be set aside: Cook v. Col-
lingridge, Jac. 607. But under ordinary circumstances the
sale of a deceased partner's interest in a firm is a perfectly
valid transaction, and those interested in his estate lose all
claim to profits from that date, whether they receive the pur-
chase money in cash, or the consideration consists of a stipula-
tion by those purchasing the share to pay for it upon some
future coniition c. at some future time. In the latter case the-
obligation of the surviving partners assumes the character of a
debt, and they acquire in exchange for it an immediate title to.
the share of the deceased with all the profits which may sub-
sequently accrue to it.
The same def'nce becomes available in behalf of the surviv-
ing partners of a decedent when there is a stipulation in the
partnership articles, that upon the death or retirement of any
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member, his associates shall have the privilege of acquiring his
interest upon certain specified terms. This privilege may also
be conferred by the will of a deceased partner. In such a case,
if the terms prescribed are complied with, there is' a complete
transfer of the partner's share to his successors, with the right
to receive the subsequent profits as in the last case.- If the
terms imposed are not complied with, the personal representa-
fives of the decedent are entitled to the profits, but only under
certain circumstances. The question depends largely upon
whether the consideration for the sale of the deceased partner's
share constitutes a condition precedent or a condition subse-
quent. If the sale is to take effect upon the fulfilment of cer-
tain stipulated conditions, and these are not fulfilled, then the
title to the share remains in the decedent's estate, and his rep-
resentatives have a right to the profits. If on the other hand,
there is an immediate transfer of the interest to the surviving
partners absolutely, or for a definite period, and the considera-
tion consists of something which is subsequently to be done
by the purchasers, then the title to the profits passes to them
at once and the beneficiaries of the deceased partner's estate
can only demand the fulfilment of the stipulated conditions.
Although the cosideration is executory the transfer of title is
immediate. If the partnership articles or the deceased part-
ner's will provide for the retention of his interest for a certain
period, at the end of which it is to be paid to his estate, his
repre.entatives are not entitled to claim profits during the
continuance of the period. If, however, the partnership is not
wound up at the designated time, and, in the absence of any
reasonable ground of excuse, the share is retained longer than
the articles or the will permit, then the surviving partners can
be held accountablt- for a proportionate share of the profits
subsequent to that date, and there will exist a two-fold reason
for so charging them if they occupy a fiduciary position under
the will of the deceased: Laird v. Chisholn, 3o Scot. Jur. 582;
Townend v. Townend, I Gift. 201; Willett v. Blanford, I
Hare, 253. A claim to profits may also be asserted
against the surviving partners, if through failure to perform
the consideration, their rights have at any time become
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forfeited, and ground afforded for the rescission of the
contract by a Court of Equity. Exactly what constitutes such
a forfeiture is still a doubtful question. It seems to be clear
however, that where an option to purchase a deceased part-
ner's share in a firm has been conferred upon the surviving
partners either by the articles or by will, and they neglect to
comply with the prescribed conditions of the sale, even though
they are conditions subsequent, they ought not to be excused.
from accounting to the estate for profits on the ground that
there has been a formal acceptance of the option : see opinion
of Lord Cairns, 7 E. & I. Ap. 329. It has been held,
however, by the House of Lords, that where the partnership
articles contain a contract of immediate sale, and the
surviving partners conform to the terms of the. agreement
in all their substantial features, a departure from these
terms which is of such a nature as not to affect the
essence of the contract will not constitute a valid ground
for its rescission by a Court of Equity, and hence no
right will devolve upon the deceased partner's representatives
to claim profits. It is altogether immaterial in such a case
that one or more of the surviving partners are also executors
of the decedent's estate. If by virtue of the terms in the part-
nership articles, they become the immediate proprietors of
their testator's share in the firm, then, with respect to that
share they must necessarily stand, not in the position of trustees,
but of debtors to the estate: see Vyse v. Foster, 7 E. & I. Ap.
332. Their rights will be controlled, by the terms of the con-
tract so long as it is in force. It was the opinion of the Court
in Vyse v. Foster, that mere delay in paying to the estate of
the deceased partner the purchase money for his share, was
not, in the absence of any circumstance making time of the
essence of the contract, such a departure from the terms of the
partnership agreement as would justify a rescission of the con-
tract. Hence, in this case and in all cases of the same general
character an account of profits will not be decreed against
either the surviving partners or the executors of a decedent as
trustees of his interest in the partnership.
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The case of Vyse v. Foster is also valuable as an authority in
that it contains many important suggestions as to the class of-
considerations which will influence a Court of Equity in-its
interpretation of contracts -relating to the disposition -of a
deceased partner's interest, in a firm. We have seen that
neither good faith nor the fact that the investment of -trust
money in trade has been productive of good results, will
excuse a trustee from the obligation of accounting for profits.
On the other hand, the question whether an executed contract
of sale, like that in Vyse v. Foster will be upheld or rescinded
by the Court, is largely dependent upon the motive which has
actuated the partners in departing from the strict terms pre-
scribed for the transaction. In Vyse v. Foster both Lord
Cairns and Lord Hatherley, in rendering-their opinions in the
House of Lords, Vyse v. Foster, 7 Eng. & Ir. Ap. 336, 342,
declared that they were largely influenced, in deciding the case
for the defendants, by the fact that the latter had been profipted
in their actions by the best intentions, that they had every
reason to believe that they were acting for the benefit of the
plaintiff, and that as a matter of fact, the plaintiff's interests
had been protected and advanced in every respect. Had there
been any bad faith, or had the results of the defendants' con-
duct been harmful to the plaintiff, they distinctly stated that
good ground would have been afforded to rescind the contract,
and to declare the partnership in an uriliquidated condition,
with the attendant liability for profits to the deceased partner's
estate.
4. The fourth case, in which the courts have imposed a limi-
tation upon a trustee's liability for profits, proceeds upon' the
assumption that the profits sought are not derived from the
trust estate but from other sources. It is clear that a cestui-
que-trust cannot claim profits upon any other ground than
beneficial ownership of the fund which produces them. If
they are wholly or largely attributable to the skill and sagacity
of the partners, or their acquired reputation, or to their credit,.
or to the established good-will of the business in a case in
which the plaintiff has no, title to the good-will, then the claim
of the cestui-que-trust is rebutted in a corresponding degree
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The two cases which best illustrate this 'principle are Wedder-
hurn v. Wedderburn, 2 Keen 722, 4 M & C. 41, 22 Beav. 84;
and Simpson v. Chapman, 4 D. M. & G. 154. In the former
case A, B, and C were in partnership as merchants, and A
died, leaving B and C his executors. The assets of the firm were
found to exceed its liabilities to the extent of 86,ooo pounds, of
which balance A's estate was entitled to 55,000 pounds, but the
good-will of the firm survived entirely to B and C under the
partnership articles. A's share of the capital was retained in
the firm by the surviving partners, and as A's children reached
full age they were paid their respective shares with interest.
During the period of thirty years which elapsed before the
final payment was made, profits accrued to the firm amounting to
over 300,000 pounds,and a bill was4led by A's next of kin. claim-
ing 55-86 of this sum. A decree of the lower court directing an
account of profits was reversed on appeal by the Master of the
Rolls, who held that A's surviving partners and executors, B
and C, were not liable for profits upon the following grounds:
i. That B and C were entirely excusable for not paying out A's
interest immediately upon his death, according to the usual
rule, since the assets of the firm consisted principally of debts
which could not be collected at once except at a great sacri-
flice and with the probable result of producing a disastrous
insolvency. 2. That A's share would have proved worthless,
if a sale had been effected at his death, since in the opinion of
the Court, not a single merchant in London would have given
a farthing for it in view of the large accompanying liability.
3. That the profits subsequently realized by the firm were
attributable entirely to the exertions of B and C, and to the
good-will of the firm, in which the estate of A had no share:
22 Beav. I07, 109.
In. the case of Simpson v. Chapman, 4 D. M. & G. 154, in
• which three partners conducted an extensive business as
bankers, a share of the subsequent profits was- refused to the
representatives of a partner who died, upon the ground that the
decedent, at'the time of his death, owed the firm upon his
private account a larger sum than his fractional share of the
difference between the assets and liabilities. It does not ap-
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pear, however, that the surviving partners possessed an exclu-
sive right to the good-will of the business. In fact, the Court
asserted its inability to adjudicate this question because all of
the surviving partners were not joined as defendants in the
suit, and consequently the claim of the deceased partner's
representatives to a share of profits did not receive adequate
consideration. Although no money was actually due from
the firm on account of the deceased partner's capital, a share
of profits might justly have been awarded upon the ground
that, at his death, he was possessed of a certain fractional.
interest in the business. For this reason it is the opinion of
the writer that the case of Simpson v. Chapman was wron'gly
decided, but the general theory upon which the Court pro-
ceeded is a sound one. According to that theory, the claim
of a cestui-que-trust to profits may be rebutted in all cases in
which it is possible for the trustee to prove that the profits
claimed, although accruing to a business in which the trust
estate is invested, are attributable exclusively to other produc-
tive agents.
To illustrate this principle further by an extreme case, if a
trustee is a member of two separate firms, and invests trust
money in one of them, the cestui-que-trust would obviously
have no right to any portion of the profits realized by the
other firm. Or again, if a firm is conducting two separate
lines of business, or if the same business consists of two dis-
tinct series of operations, one of which requires capital and the
other does not, the trustee ought not to be made liable for the
profits of the latter series upon the ground that he has invested
trust money in the former, since the profits realized in no sense
constitute the product of the trust capital. Nor, on the other
hand, as appears from the decree of the Master of the Rolls in
Wedderburn v. Wedderburn, ddes the liability for profits attach
in a case where trust funds are either invested or retained in a
business, which, although producing profits, .does so under
circumstances in which it may reasonably be presumed that
equally large profits would have been produced if the firm had
had no capital at all, using the word "capital" in the sense
which it always .has in connection -with this subject, viz., the
584 THE LIABILITIES ARISING OUT OF THE
preponderance of assets over liabilities. In such a case the
entire profits earned may rightly be claimed by those whose
exertions, skill, credit, or reputation have produced them, and
it is altogether immaterial that such persons occupy toward
the plaintiff a fiduciary relation.
Lastly, a trustee is entitled to claim a partial exemption
from the liability to account for profits, in almost all cases,
upon the ground that he deserves a reward- for the labor and
skill expended by him in superintending the business in which
the trust funds are embarked- It seldom happens that the
profits of a productive enterprise can be attributed solely to the
capital employed. As a rule, they are the joint result of
capital and business skill. Consequently it has been the
practice of the Courts, even since the case of Brown v. Litton,
see also Yates V. Finn, 13 C. D. 839, to deduct first a
portion of the profits, as a reward for the labor and skill of the
truste6 and other persons in the same position, and then to
,divide the remainder in rateable proportions between the trust
estate and the owners of the capital stock. The fraction of
the total profits which should be deducted for this purpose
varies with each individual case. It depends upon the character
of the business involved and the relative importance of capital
and skill to its successful operation: Willett v. Blanford, I
Ha. 253, 268. In some instances the skill exerted deserves to.
be rewarded by a very large fraction of the profits; in other
instances it deserves no compensation at all. For instance, if a
deceased partner in a firm had in his life-time been possessed
of a share in valuable patent rights, and these were to be
exercised by the surviving partners, his estate would be entitled
to his full fractional share of the resulting profits: I Hare,
270. An instance of the opposite kind was cited by Lord
Nrougham in the case of Docker v. SoMes, 2 M. & K. 667.
He discussed 'the case of an apothecary who should invest
ioo pounds of trust money in the purchase of drugs, and carry
''on a business yielding woo pounds a year. In such a case
the fraction of profits attributable to skill would far exceed the
portion which should be allotted to capital. A similar.ilhistra-
tion was suggested by Judge Penrose, of the Orphans' Court,
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of Philadelphia, in a recent Pennsylvania case: Seguin's
Appeal, 103 Pa. 145. A carpenter purchases with trust money
some rough boards, and out of the material so obtained makes
an elaborately carved set of furniture. Obviously the cestui-
que-trust would be entitled to an exceedingly small fraction of
the profits realized from its sale. It rarely happens, however,
that an actual case approaches either of these two extremes.
The majority of cases lie midway between them, and so differ-
ent are the circumstances in each that it is impossible to fix
upon any definite fraction which would hold good for all or
even for a large proportion of them. It should be the aim of
the Court in every instance to allot to the trust estate a frac-
tion of the total profits exactly corresponding to its value as a
productive factor. This fraction will approach, more or less,
nearly to the ratio between the total capital of the firm and the
amount of trust money invested in it according as the labor
and skill of the partners are allotted a small or a large com-
pensation. But every case should be decided on its own
merits. Accordingly the English Courts have taken the
ground that the determination of the proper fraction in a
particular case is a matter to be left entirely to the master, sub-
ject, of course, to the review of the Court: Opinion of Lord
Eldon in Cook v. Collingridge, Jac. 623; see also Crawshay
v. Collins, 2 Russ. 347. On the other hand, in several Penn-
sylvania cases, a definite rule has been followed, according to
which profits are to be divided in the proportion of one-third
as compensation for skill, two-thirds as the return upon trust
capital. This ratio was first adopted by our Supreme Court
in Robinett's Appeal, 36 Pa. 174, because it appeared to meet-
the requirements ofthat case, and the precedent thus established
has been followed irl two more recent cases of a very different
character, Seguin's Appeal, 103 Pa. 139; Small's Estate, 24
W. N. C. 92, in spite of the fact that it was not the intention of
the Court in deciding Robinettes Appeal to lay down any gen-
eral rule: See opinion of Court in 103 Pa. 145. That such a
precedent should have been followed at all is doubly unfortunate.
It is an attempt, in the first place, to establish a general
principle with reference to a subject about which it is impossible
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to generalize. It is illogical to regard as fixed that which is
essentially a variable quantity. The convenience of a fixed
standard of measurement in dealing with questions of this kind
is undoubtedly very great, but on the- other hand, such a
standard tends to deprive the law of its elasticity and to render
it more difficult for the Courts to frame just decrees in particular
instances. It is impossible to make a [fair allotment of profits,
in any case, between capital and skill,- without taking into con-
sideration all the circumstances peculiar to it. Hence, the
enforcement of any definite rule in the decision of all cases
upon the ground that it has been found, appropriate in some
one partidular instance; would operate to produce great injustice.
The one-third rule is objectionable in the second place,
because it awards to the trustee a fraction of profits, which is,
*in many instances, too large a compensation for his labor and"
skill. In lines of business in which skill is of unusual import-
ance, and capital plays a subordinate part, one-third of the
profits, or even a much larger fraction, might fairly be allotted;
but in manufacturing and mercantile pursuits, in which the
possession of an abundant capital is absolutely necessary, it is
submitted that the proportion of one-third is too large. The
true criterion by which to determine what is due to a capitalist
for the exercise of his skill has been suggested by Judge Pen-
rose in Seguin's Appeal, 103 Pa. 146. The suggestion is that
a reasonable allowance for services should not exceed the sum
which such a capitalist would have to pay a competent mana-
ger to perform his work for him. To see how this rule would
work, let us take the ordinary case of a manufacturing cor-
poration, with a capital stock of $i,ooo,ooo, and earning ten
per cent. annually upon the investment, and let us suppose
that a salary of $io,ooo is paid to the general manager, which,
as such things go, would be a liberal- compensation in a case
of this kind. Now, according to our supposition, the profits of
the enterprise for one year added to the salary of the manager
would amount to the sum of $ IOOOO; or, to put the case
differently, if we include the salary of the manager in the state-
ment of the net profits, the proportion of those profits to which
he is entitled, inistead of amounting to 'one-third of the whole
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sum, amounts only to one-eleventh. Now, let us go one step
farther and assume that the factory has a single owner who is
himself the manager, and that he invests $5oo,ooo of trust
funds in the enterprise in addition to the $I,OOO,OOO of capital
owned by himself. What proportion of the 'resulting profits
should be awarded to the trust estate? According to the
Pennsylvania rule, it would be 500,ooo-I,500,OOO X 2-3 = 2-9.
According to the more accurate principle suggested by Judge
Penrose, the trust estate is entitled to more. By capitalizing the
$ Io,ooo which the owner of the factory would have to pay to
a competent manager, employing the same rate per cent. as
before, we get $ioo.ooo. The productive forces which co-
operate to create profits may then be arranged as follows:
Capital of owner, . . . $Ioooooo
Capital of trust estate, . 500,000
Skill of manager, I ooOOO
$r,6oo,ooo
Five-sixteenths of the profits should therefore be awarded to
the trust estate, instead of the much smaller fraction of two-
ninths, obtained by the former method.
To sum up, the "one-thirds" rule is open to criticism upon
two grounds: first, that it is an attempt to establish a hard and
fast rule with reference to a commercial relation, which is
essentially variable and uncertain; second, that, in a large
class of cases, the application of the rule works injustice to
cestui-que-trustent. By permitting the trustee to retain too
large a propbrtion of the profits as compensation for his ser-
vices as a business manager, the Court in reality awards to
him a sum of money which belongs to the trust estate.
III. ,,
Having reviewed the circumstances which determine the
proportion of profits to which a cestui-que-trust is entitled,
when property belonging to him has been invested in a, part-
nership, two questions remain to be considered: First, who
may be'held liable for those profits ? Second, by what proced-
ure can this liability be enforced? The first question may be
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subdivided into an examination of the respective liabilities of
the trustee and his co-partners. The liability of the trustee
will be considered first.
The case of a trustee who invests trust-money in a business
conducted solely by himself, presents few difficulties. By
applying the principles explained in the last section, the exact
proportion of profits attributable to the use of the trust fund
can easily be determined. This sum will be the measure of
the trustee's liability, and it has been already stated that it is
immaterial whether the money has been embarked in a sepa-
rate speculation or has become mingled with the trustee's pri-
vate capital. If, however, the trust fund has been invested
in a business conducted by, the trustee jointly with other
persons who are not trustees, the liability of the former is
subject to some variation. Under certain circumstances the
trustee can be held responsible for all of the profits accruing
to the trust estate, under other circumstances only for a portion:r
of such profits.
In an article published in the Law Quarterly Review for the
month of April, 1887, by a certain G. T. Hamilton, " On the
Doctrine of Vyse v. Foster," Law Quarterly Review, Vol. III,
p. 2 11, may be found a most elaborate discussion of this branch
of the general subject. The article in, question has received
favorable notice from at least two recent text books, and this.
fact will furnish an excuse for the amount of space devoted to.
it in the present discussion.
Apparently it is the aim of the writer to prove that in every
case in which trust money has been contributed to a partner-
ship by a trustee, he should be held personally responsible for
all of the resulting profits, without regard to the question
whether such profits have been received by him or not. The
article begins by stating in a general way that the profits
realized ina partnership are the increment not of the capital of
any one partner, but of the combined capitals of all the partners.
Hence the profits which any one partner receives from the
business are the product of the capital of the firm as a whole,
and not of his individual share of that capital. For example,
if A, and B are partners, having an equal interest in the firm,
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stock, the profits accruing to A's interest do not all go to him,
but are divided equally between A and B, and the same thing
is true of the profits accruing to B's interest. Now let us as-
sume that A is a trustee, and that his moiety of the firm
capital consists exclusively of trust funds, and further, that
profits accrue to the firm which we will represent by the num-
ber four. A and B will each receive one-half of these profits,
or two units, but of A's two units one unit is the product of
the trust estate, and the other unit is the product of B's
capital. Hence, A's liability to his cestui-hque-frust, in the
present state of the law as Mr. Hamilton interprets it, is to ac-
count not for two units of profits, but only for one unit, since
the other unit has gone to B and A is accountable only for
the fraction of the trust profits which he has actually received.
This state of things, Mr. Hamilton thinks, is very unjust. A
* should be compelled to account to the trust estate for all of the
profits which have accrued to it, and not merely for a part of
them. It is true that the other half of the trust profits have
gone to B, but at the same time A has received an exact
equivalent from the product of B's capital, which he would
not have received had he not invested the trust funds in the
firm. Hence, argues Mr. Hamilton, a trustee who deals with
the trust estate in that manner, should be held accountable for
all of the resulting profits.
The line of argument, of which a sketch has just been given,
appears to the writer to be open to serious criticism. Mr.
Hamilton is undoubtedly right in saying that it is the capital
of the firm as a whole which produces profits, and not the
separate capitals of one or more of the partners. To revert to
our former illustration, the four units of profits which result
from the firm's operations are all clearly the product of the
entire capital. No one of these four units, for instance, is the
product of.A's capital any more than B's capital. But when
we come to consider the nature of the profits with reference,
not to their production, but their distribution, in other words,
when the time comes to divide the profits, a different relation
is established. The claim of each of the partners to one-half
of the four units is given effect by dividing the product into
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two equal halves. Two units are assigned to A and B
respectively, because that is what their respective capitals have
produced, and each group of two units not only represents,
but, in both an actual and a legal sense, constitutes the product
of the individuil capital of the recipient. It is like the parti-
tion of real estate between former tenants-in-common. In the
eye of the law, at a given moment, df time, the undivided
interest of each tenant. in the whole piece of realty is replaced
by an entire and individual ownership in a certain fraction of
it. So in the above illustration the two units of profits which
A receives are clearly the product of the trust estate, and there
can be no objection, either legal or metaphysical; to their
being so regarded. But in that event it would follow that,
even on established legal principles, the cestui-que-trust could
claim the endrr proflts from the trustee, making of course a
proper deduction-as a compensation for skill. There can be
4ut little doubt that such is the case. Although Mr. Hamilton
has assumed throughout his entire argument that in the exist-
ing state of the law, the cestui-que-trust can recover only one
unit, there is good ground for believing that this is a mistaken
assumption. It -is inconceivable that any Court of Equity, in
passing upon the accounts of a trustee whose int6rest in a firm
consisted solely of funds belonging to another, would permit
him to retain any portion of the resulting profits as a perquisite
of his office. The cases which Mr. Hamilton 'cites in support
of the view that such is the law, are clearly distinguishable
from the fictitious case to which his line of argument relates.
For example, he quotes at length from the opinion of the
Court in Jones v. Foxal, 15 Beav. 395. The Master of the
Rolls in adjudicating that case, said, "I cannot charge the
-trustee with a greater amount of profits than he has actually
received, and according to the evidence before me, the trustee,
Foxall, recelived only one-third part of the profits produced by
this sum," by which was meant the trust money with reference
to which the action was brought. Now the important facts of
Jones v. Foxall were that certain trust funds had been deposfted
in a bank owned and conducted by three individuals associated
as partners of whom the defendant was one. - Consequently
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any profit attributable to this particular deposit, as in the case
of any other* deposit, must have been divided equally between
the partners, in consequence of which, as the Court said, the
trustee derived only one-third of the resulting benefit. The
benefit conferred upon the trustee in Mr. Hamilton's fictitious
case consists of the entire product of the fund. His deductions
from the case of yse v. Foster, are open to the same criticism.
It is. true that Lord Cairns, in his opinion, asserted that a
trustee partner could not be made answerable for the share of
the cestui-que-trust's profits which had been received by others,
but in laying down this principle, Lord Cairhs had in con-
templation, not a case like that suggested by Mr. Hamilton in
which the trustee really receives the entire product of the fund,
but the particular case of Vyse v. Foster, in which the trust
money constituted a debt of the firm, with the result of increas-
ing the profits of all the partners equally. In the fictitious
case only the profits of the trustee himself were increased. A
fundamental distinction can therefore be drawn between two
classes of cases, which Mr. Hamilton has overlooked, nor has
it ever, within the knowledge of the writer, been clearly
presented in any text book or judicial decision. The distinc-
tion referred to by Mr. Hamilton as well as-by Lord Justice
Wood, 8 Ch. Ap. 326, and others, between the case of trust
money which is contributed to a firm, and trust money which
is loaned, approaches it in some degree, yet this is not exactly
the same distinction. The real distinction lies between that
class of cases in which trust money is invested in a firm upon
terms which permit the trustee to take the whole of the
resulting profits, and that other class of cases in which he
receives something less than the resulting profits ; and it is
altogether immaterial in the latter case, whether the investment
is in the form of a loarn, or whether it is a contribution to the
firm by the trustee without an accompanying stipulation that
he shall receive an additional share of the total profits propor-
tioned to the value of the trust funds as a productive factor.
Of these two classes of cases, Mr. Hamilton's imaginary case
is a good illustration of the first class. A and B invest the
same sum in a partnership, and share the profits equally, A's
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contribution consisting exclusively of trust money, and B's
contribution of his own private capital. In accordance with
Mr. Hamilton's contention, although on other grounds, the
trust estate is entitled to all that A receives from the business
as profits, leaving out of consideration for the sake of con-
venience the question of compensation for skill. Or we may
vary the illustration by assuming that A invests x units of his
own money in the firm, and x units of trust money, and that
B invests x units, making three x units in all, and let us
assume further that A stipulates for a proportionate share of
the profits, that is to say two-thirds. In this case also A should
be held liable for the entire profits accruing to the trust estate,
which would be one-third of the profits accruing to the firm as
a whole. The remaining two-thirds would of course be
divided equally between A and B as the return upon their
respective capitals. But let us again vary the last illustration
by assuming that A, instead of investing the trust money in
the firm with the stipulation that he shall receive a propor-
tionate increase of profits, contributes it without such a stipula-
tion, or loans it to the firm upon a promissory note, and con-
tinues to receive one-half of the total profits as before. If we
estimate the total profits at six units, the share attributable to
the trust fund will be two units, and the same sum will be
attributable to A's and B's private capitals respectively. But
A and B each receive one-half of the total profits, or three
units. Hence, of the two units of profits produced by the
trust fund, A receives one unit and B one unit. It has been
frequently held that, under these circumstances, A, the trustee
is responsible to the estate only for one unit of profits: Laird
v. Chisholn, 30 Scot. Jur. 582 ; Macdonald v. Richardson, I
Giff. 81 ; Freeman v. Fairlee, 3 Mer. 43 ; Jones v. Foall, 15
Beav. 395; Vyse v. Foster, 7 E. & I. Ap. 318; Segnin's Appeal,
103 Pa. 139; SmalI's Estate, 24 W. N. C. 92. He can
be compelled to account, not for the total profits earned by the
trust fund, but only for the share of such profits which he has
himself received. To determine, therefore, the extent of a
trustee's liability for profits in any case whatever, it is only
necessary to examine the terms of the agreement governing
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the investment of the funds, and to ascertain the proportion of
the trust profits to which the'trustee is individually entitled.
A Court of Equity will never permit a trustee to retain profits
which are the increment of trust funds, nor on the other hand,
will a trustee be compelled to account for profits which have
come into the possession of third persons.
That the liability of trustees should be limited in this man-
ner appears entirely reasonable. Very able arguments in
support of the opposite view were made by the counsel for the
plaintiffs in Laird v. Chishlm, and in Seguin's Appeal, 30
Scot. Jur. 582; 103 Pa. 139; but in both of -these cases, as
well as in many others, the Court declined to charge the trus-
tee with a larger share of profits than he had actually received.
Reference has already been made to the statement of
Lord Justice James in Vyse v. Foster, that the proper
function of a Court of Equity is to compel restitution of prop-
erty wrongfully withheld, not to impose penalties upon those
guilty of offences. Elsewhere, in the same opinion, he calls
attention to the "absurdity" of contending that, while a dis-
honest squanderer can be charged only four per cent. upon
funds which he has lost, a trustee who invests trust funds in a
firm which he knows to be solvent, should be charged not
only for the share of profits which he has individually received,
but for all the profits received by his co-partners as well. In
deciding the case of Laird v. C/hisholm, the Lord President of
the Scotch Court of Session, expressed the opinion that a
trustee could be made to account for the gains derived by his
associates from the trust funds only upon the theory that he
is individually responsible for the profits made by every debtor
to the estate; 30 Scot. Jur. 587. We have already seen
that a trustee cannot be held responsible for profits
made by an independent firm to which the trust funds
have been lent, or for profits made by his co-trustees. Upon
the same ground, a trustee is entitled to claim exoneration
from all liability to account for profits which have accrued to
his associates in a partnership. The courts have very justly
held that the mere fact that the enrichment of his co-partners
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is the indirect result of a breach of trust committed by himself,
.V is not a sufficient reason for imposing that liability upon him.
IV.
Having discussed the character and extent of the rights
which a cestui-que-trust is privileged to enforce against his
trustee, when money belonging to the trust has been employed
in trade, it is now time to inquire into the liability which is
incurred by the trustee's co-partners. It is a well-established
rule that trust property, which has come into the possession
of any person who is not a bonafide holder for value, can be
followed and recovered by the beneficial owner: I Cruise Dig.
Tit. II, Ch. 4, §§ 12, 15, 16; Hill on Trustees, pp. 164, 172;
Perry on Trusts, §§ 217, 238, Ed. of 1889, and cases; Oliver
v. Piatt, 3 How. 4O. The rights of the latter are enforced
in such a case through the medium of a constructive trust
which implies the same measure of responsibility as an
express trust: Lindley on Partnership, p. 524; Perry on
Trusts, § 245, Ed. of 1889; Bennett v. Austin, 81 N. Y.
3o8; Ryan v. Morrill, 83 Ky. 352. In accordance with this
principle, the co-partners of a trustee who have united with
him in employing trust funds in their common business,
either with knowledge of the true character of the funds, or
having the means of knowledge at command: Sadler v. Lee,
6 Beav. 324, 330; Maysh v. Keating, 2 Cl. & Fin. 250, thereby
become jointly and severally liable for the breach of trust so
committed: Lindley on Partnership, x pp. 161, 524; Exparte
Woodin, 3 M. D. & D. 399; -x parte Poulson, De. Gex. 79;
Wharton v. Clements, 3 Del. Ch. 2o9. It is the privilege of
the cestui-que-trust in such a case, not only to follow his prop-
erty into the joint assets of the firm and the separate estates
of the various partners, but also to treat the sum misappropri-
ated as a debt, and to recover it by proceeding against the
firm in an action of assumpsit: Smith v. Jamcson, 5 T. R. 6oi ;
Eixparte Watson, 2 V. & B. 414; Ex parte Heaton, Buck 386;
Davis v. Gelhans, 44 0. 69; Bush v. Bush. 33 Kan. 556. If
the trust funds can be distinctly traced into scme definite
piece of firm property or even into a mixed account in a bank,
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the right of the cestui-que-trust to reclaim his property will
take precedence over all other claims against the partnership:
Perry on Trusts, Edit. of 1889, "§§ 128, 828; Taylor v.
Plumer, 3 M. & S. 562; In re Hallett's Estate, L. R. 13 C. D.
713. If, on the other hand, the identity of the trust money
has been lost, and the claim of the cestui-que-trust has been
merged into the form of an ordinary debt, he will be allowed
to come in pai i passu with the other creditors of the firm
and to enforce the claim against both the joint assets of the
firm, and the separate estates of the partners: Guillou v. Peter-
son, 89 Pa. 163; Carter v. Lipsey, 70 Geo. 417. The cestni-
que-frust has also the full rights of a firm creditor in all cases
in which money belonging to him has been borrowed by the
firm upon a bond or a promissory note, issued either by the
firm itself, or by one of the partners in the firm name, either
with or without the knowledge of his co-partners. Although
money borrowed by a partner in his own name cannot be
recovered from the firm merely on the ground that it has been
used in the course of its business: Story on Partnership,
§ 134; Parsons on Partnership, p. 91; Bevan v. Lewis, i
Sim. 376; Hutchinson v. Smith, 7 Paige 26 ; Donally v. Ryan,
41 Pa. 3o6; Tallmadge v. Penoyer, 35 Barb. 120; Logan v.
Bond, I3 Ga. 196; it is within the implied power of any
partner to borrow money by the use of the firm name, and
thus to create the relation of debtor and creditor between the
firm and the lender of the money: Richardson v. French, 4
Metc. 577; Palmer v. Scott, 68 Ala. 380. Consequently, if a
partner has in his hands funds belonging to another under cir-
cumstances which would constitute him a trustee of such
funds, and gives the note of the firm to the owner, or as a part-
ner makes an admission of the firm's liability to account for
the money, the cesti-qi4-trust acquires the right to recover
the amount from the firm as a creditor, even though the money
was borrowed without the knowledge of the other partners:
Welker v. Wallace, 31 Ga. 362. In such a case, however, the
liability of the firm to repay the money would rest, not upon
the theory that a constructive trust had arisen, but upon the
basis of the contractual relation established.
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It has been stated that a firm is liable to account for trust
funds employed in conducting its operations in all cases in
which the partners are awire of the fact that a breach of trust
is being committed. It should be remarked in this connection,
that the knowledge of the partner investing the trust money
as to the character of the transaction, does not of itself constitute
notice to the firm, since the fact to be known does not directly
relate to the subject of the firm business: Collyer on Partner-
ship, § 414, p. 672; Lindley on Partnership, p. 312. On the
other hand, it is not necessary, in order to charge the firm and
the various partners with the liability to repay the money, that
every member should be informed of the fact that trust funds
are being dealt with. The knowledge and acquiescence of any
single partner, other than the trustee partner, is sufficient to
create a firm obligation: Guillou v. Peterson, 89 Pa. 172.
Let us suppose, however, that a trustee invests trust money
in his firm without the knowledge of his co-partners, and with-
out adopting any of the means necessary to create a contract
obligation between the firm and the cestui-que-trust, what are
the rights of the latter in such a case ? On principle it would
seem just to allow the cestui-que-trust to follow and reclaim his
money, even if it was invested by the trustee without the knowl-
edge of his co-partners. But see contra, Hollembaek v. M ore,
44 S. C., N.Y. 107. We have seen that a person who has acquired
possession of trust property can defend against the title of the
beneficial owner only by proving two facts : first, that he is a
purchaser without notice ; second, that he is a purchaser for
value. To constitute a valid defence, both of these points must
be established. It is not sufficient to establish only one of
them. Now if the firm of which the trustee is a member has dealt
with funds in ignorance of their true character, the firm may
indeed be said to be without notice, but is it correct to say that
it is a purchaser for value? It would seem not. Mr. Parsons
has reasoned out this conclusion in the following manner:
Parsons on Fartnership, § 40. "The firm is not a person
existing apart from its members," says Mr. Parsons, "but an
aggregate of the partners. . . . The ces/zi-que-trust in re-
claiming it from the firm, takes it back from the trustee, and
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from his co-partners, who have paid nothing for it out of the
joint estate, but simply added something to it in the joint
stock. The firm therefore is a volunteer, and by the doctrines
of equity, the trust fund may be followed into the hands of a
volunteer."
It must be observed, however, that the rights of the cestui-
que-trust in a case where his money has been used without the
knowledge of the trustee's co-partners, are limited to the
privilege of actually tracing his property into the hands of the
firm and reclaiming it by virtue of his superior equitable title -
Lindley on Partnership, p. 313. He has not the right in this
case to treat the sum used in the partnership as a debt due to.
him as a firm creditor: Lindley on Partnership, p. I6o;
Jacques v. Marquand, 6 Cow. 497. Consequently if the trust
money has been so employed by the trustee as entirely to lose
its identity, and it- is impossible to trace it into some definite
piece of partnership property (see rule laid down in In re-
Hallett's Estate, L. R. 13, C. D. 713), the firm is entirely free
from liability and the cestui-que-trust can have recourse only to.
the private estate of the trustee himself for compensation and
redress : Exparte Apsey, 3 Brown C. C. 265 ; Exparte Heaton
Buck 386; Willettv. Stringer, 17 Abb. P. p. R. (N. Y.) i55.
In view of the fact that the firm incurs a certain responsi-
bility to the cestui-que-trust as a constructive trustee when the
co-partners are ignorant of the breach of trust as well as when
they have knowledge of it, it might at first seem illogical to
hold them to a greater degree of liability in the latter case
than in the former. It must be remembered, however, that
the constructive trust rests upon a different basis in the two.
cases. There is a well-known distinction between a construc-
tive trust arising from the existence of fraud and one arising
in the absence of fraud! A purchaser of trust property with
notice is an example of the first; a good example of the
second is a person who honestly acquires possession of trust
property without paying a valuable consideration: Perry on
Trusts, § 241, Ed. of 1889.
A somewhat similar classification of constructive trustees
was made by Lord Selborne in the case of Barnes v. Addey,
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L. R. 9 Ch. Ap. C. 25 1, in which he pointed out that a stran-
ger to a trust might incur the responsibility of a constructive
trustee in either of two ways, by " receiving and becoming
- chargeable with some portion of the trust property," or by
"'assisting with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent
design on the part of the trustee." As a purchaser of trust
property with notice is necessarily guilty of a certain degree of
moral culpability, while this is not always the case with a pur-
chaser without consideration, it is certainly reasonable to
attach a greater degree of liability to the constructive trust in
the former case than in the latter; hence, the authorities can-
not justly be deemed inconsistent in permitting a cestui-que-
trust to recover his money as a firm debt when the partners
are aware of the breach of trust, while he is allowed only to
follow his property in specie in a case where they are ignorant
of it.
It has been stated that when the co-partners of a trustee are
aware of the fact that the firm is using trust money, their lia-
bility to account for it as a debt is both joint and several, and
also that the partners incur a similar liability whenever the
loan of trust funds to the firm is evidenced by a bond or prom-
issory note bearing the firm name. The cestui-que-trust is
further entitled to follow his property into the hands of the
individual partners, if its identity can be traced, and to recover
it, in all cases in which the defence cannot be set up that the
holder has paid value and is without notice. It should be
remarked, however, that there is one very important case in
which an individual partner might justly be allowed to defend
upon this ground when such a course would not be open to
the firm as a whole. It is the case of the investment of trust
funds in a firm by a trustee partner as his private contribution,
without the knowledge of his co-partners: See Parsons on
Partnership, § 41.
Let us revert to our former illustration and assume that A
and B have formed a partnership, in which A has contributed
the proceeds of trust money to tle capital of the firm, and B
an equivalent amount of his own property. Now we have
seen that if the cestui-que-trust is able to trace his money into
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the firm assets, he is allowed to do so, for the reason that the
firm is not "a purchaser for value." But let us assume that
in the course of the firm business, either through the distribu-
tion of profits or otherwise, a portion of the trust property
contributed by A to the firm has become part of B's private
estate. In such a case, it may fairly be argued as a reason for
exempting B from personal liability, that he has become a
purchaser of the trust funds for value and without notice: See
opinion of the Court in Hollenbaek v. More, 44 N. Y., S. C.
114, where the court goes so far as to apply this principle to
the pursuit of trust funds into the firm assets also. By enter-
ing into a partnership with A, B has acquired all the privileges
with respect to his co-partner's contribution which the status
of partnership confers. He may lawfully expend it for the
purposes of the firm business, he may contract debts which
will bind it equally with the capital which he has himself sup-
plied, he may pledge it as collateral to secure the performance
of contracts for which he has stipulated in behalf of the part-
nership, in short, he can exert the same rights with respect to
his co-partners' contribution as if he had furnished it himself.
In return for the privileges so acquired, B has given "value,"
by contributing property of his own to the uses of the firm in
such a manner as to render it subject to the exercise of the
same rights by his co-partner, A, and as the result of B's con-
tribution, it has become possible to conduct operations in the
interest of both parties, which, without it, would be impracti-
cable. Consequently, if, in the course of exercising those
rights, certain specific property of the trust estate, which A
has invested as his contribution, comes into B's exclusive pos-
session, he is entitled to retain it as a bona fide purchaser for
value. Of course, if B is aware of the real character of the
property with which h6 has been dealing, the cestui-que-trust
is clearly entitled to reclaim it, since B could not in that case
defend against the claim as a purchaser without notice; but if
he is ignorant of A's breach of trust, it would be unjust to
charge him with liability. The law does not impose upon a
partner the duty of ascertaining the source from which a co-
partner's contribution is derived. Hence, it cannot be said
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that B has constructive notice that trust funds are being used
by the firm, and in the absence of positive information to that
effect, or the existence of such a state of facts as should suffice
to put B upon his inquiry, it cannot be said that he has either
actual or presumptive notice: Exparte Geaves, 8 D. M. & G.
291.
Against the proposition that in certain cases trust funds can
be followed into the possession of the firm, but not into the
hands of the individual partners, the point might be raised that
a firm liability invariably carries with it the right to proceed
against the separate estates of the different members. It is a
sufficient answer to this objection that we are not now dealing
with an ordinary debt of the firm, recoverable in a suit at
common law, but with an equitable principle governing the
right to follow trust funds, and that it is quite possible that an
equitable right might be enforced against either the joint estate
of the firm, or the separate estates of the partners, as the case
might be, without being enforceable against both estates. For
example, it is by virtue of a well known equitable principle that
the private debt of a partner is made a primary charge upon
his separate estate, but not such a charge upon the joint estate:
Parsons on Partnership, § 102. Hence, it is entirely reason-
able that another equitable principle, viz., that of following
trust funds, should operate to charge the firm with a
liability which is not shared by the co-partners individually.
The responsibility of the firm to a cestui-que-trust who
seeks to follow and reclaim his property, is not based upon
the nature of the partnership relation, or upon any theory of
the common law. It is solely by virtue of an equitable doctrine
that the cestui-que-trust can enforce his rights. Hence, the
fact that the law of the partnership relation makes firm debts
a charge on every partner's separate estate, does not furnish
any adequate reason for a similar extension of the firm's
liability in a case in which that liability proceeds, not from the
legal structure of the partnership relation, but from an equitable
principle relating to trust property.
Having examined the various cases in which the firm and
the individual co-partners of a truste6 may be held responsible
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for the principal of the trust estate, it is now time to inquire
into their liability to account for profits. It is quite evident, at
the outset, that no valid claim to profits can exist in any case
in which there is not a corresponding right on the part of the
cestui-que-trust to recover the principal sum. It may also be
taken for granted that a co-partner of a trustee is never liable,
under any circumstances, for a larger share of the profits than
he has individually received, since it cannot be presumed that
the responsibility of a constructive trustee ever exceeds that of
an actual trustee. Bearing in mind these two important quali-
fications, the question next arises in what cases, if any, the
right of the cesfui-qne-trust to recover the principal of his
estate from the trustee's co-partners is supplemented by the
right to claim the profits which have accrued through its
employment in trade.
As a preliminary to the determination of this question, it is
necessary to inquire into the character of the liability which is
incident to a constructive trust. This purpose can be accom-
plished 'most effectually by a study of particular examples.
Let us examine the respective liabilities of (I) a vend~r of real
estate who has received the purchase money, but has not yet
parted with the legal title; (2) a trustee who buys at his own
sale; (3) a person who speculates with money belonging to
another; (4) a surviving partner of a decedent who continues
to trade with assets of the estate. It will be observed that in
each of these instances, the property of one person has come
into the possession of another under circumstances which give
rise to a constructive trust. In every instance there is the
obligation to account to the real owner for the value of the
property acquired. But the obligation does not stop there.
The real owner may not only hold the constructive trustee
liable for the value of his'property, but he is entitled to demand
the property itself, and if it has risen in value in the trustee's
hands, the benefit will accrue to him and not to the trustee.
Thus, in the first case cited in illustration, if the land purchased
by the vendee increases in value while the legal title is still in
the vendor, the entire benefit will result to the vendee, since the
latter by virtue of the constructive trust established, can demand
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a conveyance of the land itself. So in the second case, if a
trustee buys trust property at his own sale, a constructive
trust immediately arises in favor of the former beneficial owner,
which will enable him not only to demand a restoration of his
property in specie, which would give him the advantage of an
increase in value, but an account of the income of the property
during the intervening time: Perry on Trusts, § 196, Ed. of
1889; Ex parte Reynolds, 5 Ves. 707, and cases cited in note;
Fox v. Macreath, 2 Brown Ch. C. 400; Moody v. Vandyke, 4
Bin. 43. The constructive trustee is under a similar obliga-
tion to account for profits in the third case: Brown v. Litton,
IO Mod. 2o; Robinett's Appeal, 36 Pa. 174; and we have
already seen that the surviving partners of a decedent who
deal with the latter's property in the manner stated in the
fourth case, not only incur a liability to account for the interest
of -the decedent in the partnership, but the additional liability
to account for all the profits which are attributable to the use
of his assets in the business: see opinion of Lord
Cairns in Vyse v. 'Foster, 7 E. & I. Ap. 318. It appears,
therefore, to be the general rule that whenever there
exists a liability in Equity to account for a principal sum, upon
the ground that a constructive trust has been created, there
exists also a liability to account for the resulting profits in the
same manner as in the case of an express trust. Hence, it
follows that in that class of cases in which the beneficial owner
of trust funds is permitted to recover his property either from
the firm as a whole or from the individual partners, upon the
ground that the latter have constituted themselves constructive
trustees, the right to recover the principal sum invested is.
supplemented by the right to recover accrued profits.
The conclusion which has just been reasoned out purely as.
a matter of principle is in strict accord with the only direct
authority bearing upon this question, which is to be found in
the reports. The case of Flocton v. Bunning, 8 Ci. Ap. 323,
note, was decided by the English Court of Chancery in 1864.
The facts of that case were that A, the sole proprietor of a
business establishment died, leaving B, his widow, the execu-
trix of his estate, which was devised upon certain trusts with.
EMPLOYMENT OF TRUST FUNDS IN PARTNERSHIPS. 603
the direction to convert. B wound up the business, and then
recommenced it in partnership with C and D, employing for
the purpose assets of the estate in plain violation of the terms
of the will. A second partnership succeeded the first one,
which like the latter was conducted largely with the testator's
money, and after the lapse of several years, B, the execuitrix of
the deceased became bankrupt. A bill was filed by the six
children of A, as beneficiaries of his will, against B, and the
various persons who had been her co-partners during the time
that the breach of trust had continued. Sir John Stuart, V. C.,
directed an account of the firm's affairs, and decreed a restora-
tion by all the defendants of the testators property with profits,
or with five per cent. interest, at the will of the plaintiffs. On
appeal the decree was affirmed, L. J. Selwyn remarking that in
order to charge all the defendants both for principal and pro-
fits, but two things need be proved: first, "That some portion
of the fund was employed in trade in breach of the trusts of
the will; second, that the breach of trust was known to the
respective partners upon their entrance into the firm. As it
plainly appeared in the case of Flacton v. Bunning that the
partners all had this knowledge, their liability to account both
for principal and profits was treated by the Court as not aod-
mitting of the slightest doubt."
It will be observed that in the case of -Flocton v. Bunning,
the Court adopted "knowledge of the breach of trust" as the
test of a co-partner's liability to account for the principal and
increment of the trust estate. It has already been explained,
that such knowledge impo facto gives rise to a constructive-
trust since it renders impossible the defence of "no notice."
But it has also been stated that there are other cases in which
there exists a similar liability to account for the principal of
the trust estate upon other grounds than knowledge of the
breach of trust. An examination of these cases will show that
in some instances there is, and in others there is not, a con-
current liability to account for profits.
We have seen that the firm incurs a certain responsibility tco
the cestui-que-trust with respect to the principal of the trust
estate in four instances, and the individual partners in three
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instances. The firm assets are liable, first (I) for a loan to the
firm by a partner with the knowledge of his co-partners that
the money is trust property; second (2) for a loan made with-
out such knowledge; third (3) for trust funds invested by a
partner, as his contribution or otherwise, with the knowledge
of his co-partners; and fourth (4) for such a contribution made
without their knowledge, provided the property can be traced.
Fifth (5) the individually partners are responsible for trust
money invested by one of their number as a loan, when they
have knowledge of the fact; and sixth (6) when they do not
have this knowledge; and lastly (7) they are individually re-
sponsible for trust money invested as a contribution when they
have knowledge of its character. In what would otherwise
constitute the eighth (8) case, viz., where a partner contributes
the trust money without the knowledge of his co-partners, we
have seen that they incur no individual responsibility what-
ever. Now it will be observed that in the first four
cases the firm is liable to the cestui-que-trust in the
character of a constructive trustee, for the reason that it is not
" a purchaser for value." In the fifth and seventh cases the
individual partners are responsible since they are affected with
notice. It will also be observed that in the first, second, fifth
and sixth cases the firm assets and the separate estates of the
partners are liable to the cestui-que-trust for the principal sum
invested with interest, upon the ground of contract, just as they
are liable for any other debt of the firm. Now we have seen
that the responsibility of a constructive trustee includes not
only the liability to restore the principal sum invested, but also.
a liability of the same kind to account for profits. On the
other hand, the claim of the cestui-que-trust when it rests ex-
clusively upon the ground of contract, cannot include profits,
but only such interest or other return upon the sum loaned as
the terms of the contract require. Hence, it follows, that the
trust estate is entitled to profits in all those cases in which the
right to recover the principal proceeds upon the theory that
the firm or the individual partners are liable as constructive
trustees, or upon that theory and upon the ground of contract
obligation combined; but that there can be no liability to ac-
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count for profits when the responsibility for the principal sum
rests solely upon the ground of contract. Consequently, of
the seven cases in which there is a responsibility devolving
upon the firm or the individual partners to restore the principal
of the trust estate, profits can be recovered in the first, second,
third, fourth, fifth and seventh cases. In the sixth case profits
cannot be recovered.
A minor point deserves to be noticed in passing. It has
been said that profits can be recovered in the seventh case,
which would render the separate estate of a co-partner liable
for the profits upon money invested by a trustee, when the
former is aware of the nature of the contribution. The co-
partner is indeed responsible as constructive trustee for the
share of trust profits received, but it must be observed that in
such a case it would seldom happen that he would receive any
profits. Except in very rare instances, a trustee, upon invest-
ing trust money as part of his contribution, would stipulate for
a proportionate increase in his own share of the profits. In
such a case, as we have seen, the trustee himself can
be compelled to restore the whole of the profits accruing
to the trust estate, and no liability would attach to his co-part-
ners for any portion of them, simply because they did not
receive them; although, as we have seen, they become liable
in such a case as constructive trustees to restore the principal
sum.
A strong argument in favor of the view of a co-partner's
liability here presented, is the fact that the opposite view
would render it impossible in most cases for a Court of Equity
to protect the rights of a cestui-que-trust. We have seen that
a trustee partner cannot, consistently with equitable principles,
be held responsible for a larger share of profits than he has
personally received. Consequently, whenever it happens that
the trust profits have been divided around equally between all
the partners, as in the case of a loan to the firm, only a small
fraction can be recovered from the trustee himself. In a firm
of five partners, he would be responsible only for one-fifth of
the trust profits, in a firm of ten, only for one-tenth, and so on.
Hence, great injustice would result if the cestui-que-trust should
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be denied the privilege of proceeding against his trustee's co-
'partners, and of recovering from them the profits which right-
fully belong to him. It is the aim of a Court of Equity to do
complete justice wherever that is possible. In the case under
discussion, it is admitted that the profits sought from the co-
partners are due entirely to the employment of trust money,
and to the employment of it under circumstances which would
render the co-partners liable, as constructive trustees, to
replace it in the event of its being lost. Consequently, it is
entirely in accord, both with the general spirit which actuates
a Court of Equity, as well as with definite equitable principles,
to accord the relief to which it is claimfed that the cestui-que-
trust is entitled. Such relief would be given against a con-
structive trustee, as in the case of an express trustee, upon the
theory of compensation and restitution, not upon the theory
that the defendants were in any way to be subjected to it pen-
alty for misconduct. The co-partners should restore the
profits to the cestui-que-trust because they are his property,
and upon no other ground. In this way, the liability of the
co-partners would become the exact complement of the lia-
bility of the trustee, and an equitable degree enforcing the two
liabilities would result in doing complete and substantial jus-
tice between the parties.
V.
Having ascertained what the principles are which determine
the extent of the cestui-que-trust's claim against a partnership
in which his funds have been invested, a brief review will now
be made of the different modes of procedure by which he can
enforce his rights, and of certain general rules which govern
the statement of the profit account. We have seen that the
cestui-que-trust has rights which he can enforce in all cases
against his trustee, and, in the majority of cases, against the
firm and the trustee's co-partners. It is, therefore, optional
with him whether he will enforce these rights by a single bill
against all the members of the firm as defendants, or by
separate bills directed against the trustee, and against his co-
partners. The former method would have the advantage of
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bringing all the liabilities arising in the case before the review
of the Court at the same time, and except in very complicated
cases, complete justice could be administered in a single decree.
If, on the other hand, the cestui-que-trust should prefer to file
a bill against the trustee alone, he could recover, as we have
seen, the principal sum invested with the share of the profits
received by the trustee himself; and he would, of course, have
the further privilege of filing a separate bill against the co-
partners for the purpose of obtaining from them the balance of
profits due.
It has been said that the difficulties in the way of computing
the profits due to a ceshui-que-trust do not constitute any reason
why a decree awarding such profits should not be made.
Many of these difficulties are, of course, peculiar to
individual cases, and no general discussion of them is possible.
Certain rules, however, can be laid down with respect to the
proper statement of the account, which are likely -to prove
serviceable.
It is essential in every case to begin the calculation by
ascertaining the value, in money of the cestui-que-trust's interest
in the firm business. If this interest consists exclusively of a
share of the capital stock, or of money loaned to the firm, then
the balance due the trust estate at any given time will consti-
tute the proper basis for computing profits: Townend v. Town-
end, I Giff. 20t. If the funds remain in the business for a
series of years, and no intermediate payments are made to the
estate, the interest of the cestui-que-trust will increase every
year to the extent of his share in the profits earned. The
proportion of profits which the cestui-que-trust is entitled to
claim in any particular year will correspond to the ratio which
the value of his interest bears to the total capital of the firm
(Laird v. ClIIshI0m, 30 Scot. Jur. 583 ; Brown v. DeTastet, Jac.
284, 288; Seguin's Appeal, 103 Pa 139), with an allowance
for skill, and also a further allowance in exceptional cases like
Weddey burn v. Wedderburn, 22 Beav. 84, for the part which
the good-will of the business, or the credit employed, or the
patents and franchises owned by the partners have played in
producing the profits realized. For the purposes of this calcu-
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lation, the capital of the firm at any given time is to be ascer-
tained by subtracting its liabilities from its assets, since the
difference betcen these two sums 'represents the amount of
money which the trustee and his co-partners have at stake in
the business. Of course, this capital is liable to increase year
by year, if any portion of the profits of the business remain
undisturbed, just as it has been shown that the trust funds will
increase, under the same circumstances, and consequently the
share of profits due to the estate is never likely to remain the
same for two successive years: Wedderburn v. Wedderburn, 22
Beav. 84; Simpson v. Chapman, 4 De G. M. & G. 174; Small's
Estate, 24 W. N. C. 92.
A very interesting question arises as to the character of the
cestui-que-ttst's rights, if during a portion of the period in
which his money has been invested in the firm, there have oc-
curred losses instead of profits. Is the cestui-que-trust pivileged
in such a case to divide the period, and to elect to take profits
for a portion of the time, and interest for the remainder? This
question arose under somewhat peculiar circumstances in the
case of Heathcote v. Hiume, I. J. & W. 122. In that case trust
funds were invested in a firm, and for several ,years large pro-
fits were realized. A change of partners then occurred, an old
partner retiring and a new one assuming his place, and for the
balance of the time the funds remained in the firm, the busi-
ness was much less successful. The plaintifts in their bill,
claimed profits for the first period interest during the second,
but the justice of the claim was denied by the Court. The
substitution of one partner for another could not properly be
regarded as a sufficient reason for dividing the investment into
fractions. " In fact," said the Master of the Rolls, "nothing
short of the embarkation of funds in a new trade, or at a new
place, would make it just to break the period."
The same conclusion was reached in a Massachusetts case
(Washburn v. Goodman, 17 Pick. 526, 579; see also Goodburn
v. Stevens, I Md. Ch. 420, 437), in which a firm continued
business after the death of one ot the partners, and a share in
the subsequent profits was claimed by those interested in his
estate. The Court held that in estimating the amount of pro-
